Veterinary OncologyBiotechStrategyCancer Research

Making Cancer Vaccines
The Default For Dogs

Moderna just proved personalized neoantigen vaccines work. A YC startup just proved venture capital will fund the canine version. Neither has solved the thing that actually decides who wins — and it isn't the science. This is a backcast from 2031, written to find the gaps while they're still cheap to fix.

Shashank PadalaFounder, Kirak Labs 13 min readAug 20, 2026
Target: Veterinary oncologists · Biotech operators · Anyone who has priced a personalized therapy
Line-art illustration on a dark ground: a sequencing readout, a single vaccine vial, and a stethoscope, with the outline of a seated dog behind them.
Chapter 00

Two Things Happened This Year

On August 19th, Moderna and Merck announced that a personalized mRNA cancer vaccine slowed melanoma recurrence in the first randomized Phase 3 trial of its kind. 1,137 patients. Moderna's stock roughly doubled in a day. After a decade of "promising early data," the neoantigen thesis finally cleared the bar that matters.

Five months earlier, an Australian data scientist named Paul Conyngham had used ChatGPT and AlphaFold to design a personalized mRNA vaccine for his own dog, Rosie, who had aggressive mast cell cancer and months to live. It shrank her tumours 75%. That experiment became Gamgee, a Y Combinator Summer 2026 company with a $4M seed led by Founders Fund, now running canine trials in Australia with UNSW and the Garvan Institute.

Read together, those two events settle the two questions that usually kill a company like this before it starts. Does the science work? Yes — a Phase 3 says so. Will anyone fund the dog version? Yes — Founders Fund already did.

What neither event settled
Whether anyone can make a personalized vaccine cheaply enough that a veterinary oncologist prescribes it by default instead of as a last resort. That is a manufacturing logistics problem, not a biology problem — and it is completely unclaimed in North America.

Cost to make one personalized dose

~$150K

at commercial CDMO rates

10×gap

What owners already pay for cancer

$10–20K

chemo, radiation, combination

Close this gap and the vaccine becomes standard of care. Fail to close it and it stays a luxury for a few hundred wealthy owners a year. Everything else in this post is downstream of that one number.

I built an open-source pipeline that does the computational half of this — tumour variant file in, ranked canine neoantigens and a synthesis-ready mRNA construct out. That part is solved and nearly free. What follows is my attempt to write down honestly what it would take to do the other half, structured as a retrospective from a future where it worked.

Chapter 01

Where The Money Actually Goes

Sequencing got cheap. Manufacturing did not. Almost every strategic decision in this business follows from that asymmetry.

The instinct is to assume genome sequencing is the expensive part. It was, a decade ago. Clinical-grade tumour-normal whole genome sequencing has fallen under $1,500 a pair, with turnaround inside two weeks. Running my pipeline on that data costs somewhere around $15 in cloud compute.

Then you try to turn the output into something you can put in a syringe.

Cost stack · one dog, no scale

Tumor + normal sequencing$1.5–5K

Clinical-grade tumor-normal WGS is now under $1,500 a pair at institutional volume

Bioinformatics + compute$100–500

Cloud pipeline. Effectively a rounding error

mRNA construct design~$0

Software. Already built

GMP manufacturing + release testing$100–300K

A personalized vaccine is, by definition, a batch of one — full QC overhead for a single dose

Vet clinical costs$5–20K

Biopsy, imaging, monitoring, ethics oversight

Human personalized neoantigen vaccines currently cost north of $100,000 per patient to manufacture — BioNTech has said publicly it is trying to get below $100K a dose, which tells you where they are now. A single clinical-trial drug product batch generally runs $300K to $1M regardless of how many doses come out of it. And a personalized vaccine is, by construction, a batch of one. You pay the full batch-release and QC overhead to produce a single injection for a single animal.

The number that decides everything
Manufacturing is roughly 70–90% of the cost of a personalized dose at n=1. Not sequencing, not compute, not the clinical work. Any strategy for this business that does not have a specific plan for that line item is a strategy for a science project.

Which raises an obvious question, and it is the one that reframed this entire thing for me.

Chapter 02

So How Did One Guy Do It For $3,000?

The answer is not that he found a cheaper CDMO. He never entered that market at all.

Conyngham has said his out-of-pocket cost was a few thousand dollars. Against a six-figure commercial manufacturing bill, that looks impossible. The breakdown explains it:

StepWho did itWhat it cost him
Tumour + healthy DNA sequencingUNSW~$3,000 AUD
Neoantigen identificationHimself, with ChatGPT + AlphaFold$0
mRNA construct design + reviewUNSW RNA researchersVolunteered
Manufacturing the vaccineUNSW RNA Institute, funded through NCRIS / Therapeutic Innovation AustraliaSubsidised
AdministrationUniversity of Queensland, under ethics approvalAcademic protocol

He never paid a contract manufacturer, because he never used one. The vaccine was produced at a government-funded academic RNA facility, for a compelling one-off research case, at roughly the cost of consumables — and the expertise around it was donated by researchers who found the problem interesting.

The replicable part
The first dose does not have to be economically rational. It has to be scientifically interesting enough that a subsidised academic facility wants its name on it. That is a fundamentally different sales motion than procurement — and it is available to anyone with a credible pipeline and a compelling case.

For a Toronto-based attempt, the structural analogue is CCRM's Centre for Cell and Vector Production at MaRS — a 20,000 sq ft GMP facility built with UHN, designed precisely to carry academic work toward the clinic, and sitting in the same building cluster as the Princess Margaret Genomics Centre and OICR. One relationship, three stages of the pipeline.

The honest caveat: CCRM's publicly documented GMP capability is cell and gene therapy and viral vectors, not mRNA-LNP specifically. Whether that extends — or whether they would stand it up for a landmark case the way UNSW did — is a phone call, not a search result.

Chapter 03

A Retrospective From 2031

Assume it worked and personalized vaccines became the default canine cancer treatment in Canada and the US. Working backwards, seven things carried the story. Notice how few of them are science.

01

Cost per dose broke below the price of chemotherapy

Three compounding moves did it. One standardised construct architecture, so every dog's vaccine was the same validated process with a different sequence — which lets a regulator treat it as a platform rather than a new product each time. A shift from contract manufacturing to owned benchtop-scale production once volume justified it. And release testing batched across parallel patient runs instead of paid per dog. By year four there were three compact production cells: Toronto, then two US sites.
02

The autogenous-vaccine pathway was ridden early and hard

Competitors tried to license a product and stalled. A per-patient vaccine legally resembles an autogenous biologic — an established category that both CFIA and USDA already know how to regulate, produced in an approved facility under veterinary supervision. So the quality system qualified the platform and the facility, not each individual vaccine. A pre-submission meeting with CFIA's veterinary biologics centre in year one shaped the facility design before a single dog was dosed.
03

Evidence came from one indication, done properly

Specialists prescribe on published, controlled data in a specific cancer — not on compassionate-use anecdotes, however moving. One high-incidence, poor-prognosis indication, run as a controlled trial at the Ontario Veterinary College through the NIH Comparative Oncology Trials Consortium, made the data multi-site and US-credible from day one. One clean survival-benefit publication outperformed twenty case reports.
04

Distribution rode the specialty referral network

Roughly a quarter of dogs develop cancer, but treatment decisions funnel through a few hundred board-certified veterinary oncologists in North America. The company scaled the way IDEXX and Antech scaled diagnostics: the vet ships a sample, gets back a treatment, bills the client. It never touched the dog. When the top fifty specialty hospitals held standing accounts, "default" followed mechanically.
05

Insurance made price a non-event

At $8–15K the vaccine priced inside the existing chemotherapy and radiation envelope rather than above it. Because pet insurers already reimburse cancer treatment at 70–90% after deductible, no new reimbursement category had to be invented — it only had to be coded as cancer treatment. Getting onto major carriers' covered-treatment lists converted the vaccine from a luxury purchase into a checkbox.
06

The team made it credible before the data did

What opened OVC, CCRM, and the seed round in year one was a board-certified veterinary oncologist co-founder and a real scientific advisory board. Investors were not underwriting the science — Moderna had already done that. They were underwriting whether this specific team could run a regulated clinical operation.
07

The human-platform thesis stayed upside, never the operating plan

The same infrastructure eventually compresses cost for human personalized vaccines, and that belongs in a Series B deck. Companies that blurred the line drowned in human-regulatory gravity before their veterinary business matured. The dog market alone carried the valuation.
Chapter 04

The Three Ways It Dies

Same backcast, inverted. Each of these is cheap to guard against today and expensive to fix later.

Cost — it stays a luxury
Manufacturing never breaks below roughly $30K a dose. The product serves a few hundred wealthy owners a year, never reaches standard of care, and never justifies the capital it raised. This is the most likely failure and the least discussed.
Evidence — the first trial is ambiguous
Trial one is underpowered, or sits in an indication where the standard of care is already decent, and the survival signal fails to separate from control. Specialist adoption is poisoned for years. Oncologists do not casually revisit a treatment that already disappointed them.
Speed — the wrong year one
Year one gets spent polishing the pipeline — the fun part, the part I'm good at — instead of closing the oncologist co-founder and the manufacturing relationship. A competitor with Gamgee's momentum locks up the consortium trial sites first, and North America stops being open territory.

The third one is the one I have to actively resist. Writing more pipeline code feels like progress and requires no one's permission. Recruiting a board-certified oncologist co-founder feels like nothing is happening for months. The second is worth more.

Chapter 05

Year One, In Order

Strictly sequenced. Each step unlocks the next, and the manufacturing conversation starts before it's needed because it has the longest lead time of anything on the list.

1

Close the veterinary oncology co-founder

A DVM with ACVIM oncology board certification and trial experience. Everything downstream — trial site, regulator, investor — evaluates the team before the technology.

2

Open the CFIA pre-submission conversation

Establish the autogenous / research-use pathway with the Canadian Centre for Veterinary Biologics before facility and protocol decisions harden.

3

Secure the manufacturing relationship

The closest Canadian analogue to the subsidised academic route that produced Rosie's vaccine. Longest lead time on this list, which is why it starts third rather than last.

4

Select the indication for trial one

High incidence, poor prognosis, dissatisfying standard of care, motivated owners. This choice determines whether the resulting publication actually moves specialists.

5

Raise the seed on that package

Co-founder, regulatory pathway, manufacturing partner, named indication, trial site. Not a deck — a critical path with signatures on it.

Note what is not on that list: model improvements, a better ranking algorithm, a nicer dashboard. The computational pipeline is already ahead of where the rest of the business is. Its marginal value is near zero until a dog can actually receive what it designs.

Chapter 06

Nobody Has To Be Convinced To Spend

This is not a market that needs creating. Owners already spend at this level, on treatments with materially worse odds than what the human melanoma data just demonstrated.

Current standard of careTypical costInsurance
Surgical tumour removal$500 – 5,000Covered as illness
Chemotherapy, full protocol$3,000 – 10,00070–90% after deductible
Radiation therapy$4,000 – 10,000+70–90% after deductible
Combination therapy$10,000 – 20,000+70–90% after deductible

Roughly one in four dogs develops cancer, with risk climbing sharply after age ten. Owners routinely authorise five figures for protocols that buy months. A vaccine at $8–15K sits inside that envelope rather than above it — which is exactly why the strategic problem is manufacturing cost and not willingness to pay.

The reframe
This is a manufacturing company with a bioinformatics moat — not a bioinformatics company with a manufacturing problem. I spent a year building the second thing. The backcast says the first thing is what wins.
Chapter 07

What I'm Actually Asking For

A working end-to-end pipeline exists today: variant file in, ranked canine neoantigens and a synthesis-ready mRNA construct out, validated on real canine coordinates, deployed publicly, open source. That is the part most people in this space are still pitching on a slide.

What it needs now is two people. A board-certified veterinary oncologist who wants to run the trial that makes this the default treatment. And a manufacturing lead who believes the per-dose cost curve can be broken and has opinions about how.

I am neither of those people. I am a builder who got a pipeline to work and then read enough to understand which half of the problem is still open. If the backcast above is wrong somewhere, I would genuinely rather find out now — the whole point of writing it down is to make the errors visible while they are still cheap.

Where I know the numbers are soft
The ~$150K manufacturing figure is extrapolated from published human personalized-vaccine costs, not a quote from a veterinary CDMO. The sub-$5K target is a reasoned destination, not a validated one. And the CCRM capability question in Chapter 02 is genuinely open. If you know these numbers better than I do, that is the most useful thing you could tell me.
Shashank Padala

Shashank Padala

Founder, Kirak Labs · AI Product Leader

AI Product & Transformation Leader with 8+ years building production LLM systems. Previously led GenAI integration into an internal content-authoring platform at a Fortune 500 enterprise, serving millions of employees globally — an AI assistant embedded in the CMS that surfaced grounded, cited insight from engagement and support-ticket data to inform what the team published next.

SYSTEM ONLINE
RAG Pipeline Active
Vector DB Connected
Guardrails Enabled